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The Bakumatsu Political Debate
The opening of the Japan to the West in 1853 began a process which economically,
militarily, and politically destroyed the Tokugawa bakufu. A number of the domains
demanded increased participation in national affairs. The imperial court in Kyoto
was politicized. The political framework which had prevailed for over 200 years
crumbled. The bakufu was no longer the national government. A new rearrangement,
and a new definition of the nation, was required.
The bakumatsu period, fifteen years of intense political debate and civil strife, saw
the working out of this new political alignment. In the end the bakufu was discarded,
as were the domains. The court, under the control of progressive and tough-minded
men, formed a new national government. It became the motive force behind Japan’s
rapid industrialization and development into a modern and powerful nation.
The Meiji imperial system was not inevitable. There were other possible solutions
to the central problem facing Japan during the period after 1853: how to unite the
nation. Basically there were two alternatives. On the one hand were advocates of a
more inclusive political union. Yokoi Shon¯an’s notion of “government through open
debate” (kog¯i seitai) provided ideological underpinning for this position. There were
calls for “unity between the court and the bakufu” (kob¯u gattai), for a “confederation
of daimyo” (reppan dom¯ei), and even for the establishment of a British-style parlia-
mentary system. Katsu Kaishu,¯ a bakufu retainer, is particularly known for his at-
tempt in the 1860s to set up a national assembly so as to enable a more equal sharing
of power between the bakufu, domains, and the imperial court.
On the other hand were supporters of a more exclusive arrangement. Political
power, as Yoshida Shoi¯n put it, should be the possession of one man (ikkun banmin).
While this buttressed the movement to overthrow the Tokugawa “feudal” regime and
create a centralized nation state under direct imperial rule, the argument was also
available to those who sought to strengthen the bakufu. Oguri Tadamasa is the best
known of these advocates of Tokugawa absolutism, but Fukuzawa Yukichi also is-
sued a call for what he called a “Taikun monarchy.”
This paper deals with Fukuzawa Yukichi’s political thought in the period immedi-
ately before the collapse of Tokugawa rule.1) It takes the form of commentary and
translations of several documents written by Fukuzawa in 1866 and 1867, including a
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memorial advocating the subjugation of Chos¯hu.¯ Fukuzawa was, of course, one of the
leading experts on the West, and beginning in 1864 an official of the Tokugawa re-
gime. He translated diplomatic correspondence and gleaned information useful to the
government from newspapers and other foreign sources. In 1866 he published his first
major book, Seiyo¯ jijo¯ (Conditions in the West) and in 1867 founded Keio Gijuku.
And despite later protestations of disinterest, he was passionately committed to the
Tokugawa cause. His memorial sought the means to crush the Chos¯hu ¯“rebels” and
thereafter he refined his thinking about the need to re-structure Japan’s government as
a monarchy under the leadership of the shogun. By 1868 he may well have given up
the bakufu as a lost cause, but his ideas about monarchy continued to inform his
understanding of the new Meiji “monarchy.”
The Memorial
The years 1865 and 1866 were disastrous for the bakufu. A second expedition to
chastise Chos¯hu ¯had been proclaimed in the fourth month of 1865. Actual military
campaigns, however, did not begin until over a year later, in the sixth month of 1866.
The insistent demands of the foreign powers complicated matters. The foreign na-
tions, further, were often at odds with one another. The French supported the idea of
a second Chos¯hu ¯expedition. The policy of Leon Roches centered around strengthen-
ing bakufu authority in the eventual hopes of obtaining extensive trading privileges.
The British, reacting both to the French support and to the obvious weakness of the
bakufu, began to develop sympathies with the southwestern domains, Chos¯hu ¯and
Satsuma. These two, finally, began to develop sympathies with each other. In the first
month of 1866, Sakamoto Ryom¯a mediated a secret alliance; both parties agreed to
cooperate in an anti-bakufu policy.
Political disorder contributed directly to economic anxiety and social unrest. The
commencement of foreign trade created further dislocations. The price of rice sky-
rocketed and with it popular discontent. There were more riots and outbursts of com-
moner violence in 1866 than in any other year of the rule of the Tokugawa shoguns.
When, in the fifth month of 1866, large-scale rural uprisings and urban riots took
place in Hyogo, Osaka, and Edo, in which impoverished commoners wrecked the
establishments of the rich and powerful, Katsu Kaishu ¯lamented that the bakufu was
about “to collapse from within.”2)
Social unrest and foreign pressure buffeted the bakufu, but it was “sectionalism”
that threatened to destroy it. One by one the domains found excuses not to contribute
to the bakufu’s war effort against Chos¯hu.¯ Satsuma, in particular, refused to send
troops into the field, despite repeated bakufu and even imperial orders. And when the
Tokugawa troops did take to the field, they were soundly defeated. The death of
shogun Iemochi in the seventh month of 1866 further blackened the bakufu’s pros-
pects, although it did provide a pretext to temporarily halt the hostilities. A cold war
ensured. In the eighth month, Yoshinobu succeeded to the headship of the Tokugawa
family and later, in the twelfth month, to the office of shogun. His advisers in Edo,
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including Oguri Tadamasa, Ogasawara Nagamichi and Kurimoto Jou¯n, urged him to
cooperate with Roches and carry out a series of military and administrative reforms
designed to strengthen the bakufu. In the sixth month of 1866, Oguri explained his
plan to Katsu Kaishu:¯ “Since it is now a dangerous time for the bakufu, we are bor-
rowing money from France and are asking for a warship and seven smaller ships to be
purchased on time payments. Once these are obtained our first task is to subjugate
Chos¯hu ¯and next, to smash Satsuma. When we have done this there will be no more
daimyo who meddle in the affairs of the bakufu. Taking advantage of this situation we
will strip away all the land from the daimyo and create a gun-ken (centralized)
state.”3)
Katsu was dismayed by Oguri’s vision of autocratic Tokugawa rule. His position
was that the shogun should share rather than monopolize political authority. Soon
after his meeting with Oguri, Katsu recorded his view of the crisis of 1866:  “Since
the times are such that one must enter into international relations as a united nation,
the creation of a gun-ken (centralized) state is only natural. However, as to the means
to that end, the Tokugawa family should not, simply for its own sake, crush all the
other daimyo and by itself institute unified authority and rule over the nation. If the
Tokugawa family sincerely thinks of Japan, it should voluntarily bring itself down
and reduce its own lands. It should encourage those who are efficient in handling the
affairs of the state to be placed into positions of actual power. It is a ridiculous thing to
think of hating Satsuma and Chos¯hu ¯and wanting to crush them.”4)
Fukuzawa’s memorial must be placed within this context. Originally a retainer of
the Nakatsu domain, in the tenth month of 1864 he accepted official employment with
the Tokugawa government as a translator in Office of Foreign Affairs. Contrary to
the “non-partisan” image later cultivated in his autobiography, Fukuzawa was in fact
a passionate supporter of the bakufu. It was, perhaps, the lesser of two evils, but
Fukuzawa clearly felt that the Tokugawa regime was Japan’s only hope of progress-
ing along the lines of “civilization and enlightenment” (bunmei kaika). He saw the
impending civil war in Japan in simple terms: the bakufu was on the side of order and
progress and Chos¯hu ¯represented chaos and retrogression. Privy to diplomatic corre-
spondence and foreign news (one of his jobs was to translate the foreign press for the
Tokugawa foreign office), Fukuzawa was also aware that the bakufu was in a precari-
ous position. News of the outbreak of the “Four-Sided War” on the 7th day of the
sixth month, 1866, quickly reached Fukuzawa’s ears. His source of information was
probably his patron since the days of the Kanrin-maru voyage to San Francisco, Ad-
miral Kimura Yoshitaka. By the 2nd day of the seventh month, both Fukuzawa and
Kimura knew that the war was not going well. On the 26th Kimura was ordered to
Edo Castle and appointed Acting Minister of the Navy; that day also brought the
hushed news of the death of Iemochi, the Shogun, who had died in Osaka on the 20th.
According to Kimura’s diary, Fukuzawa visited his house that night to discuss these
turn of events.5) Then on the 29th, just before Kimura’s departure for Osaka,
Fukuzawa brought his memorial and asked Kimura to forward it to bakufu officials in
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Osaka. Included with the memorial was a draft of Seiyo¯ jijo¯ (Conditions in the West)
which Fukuzawa was writing at the time.
* * *
Memorial Concerning the Subjugation of Chos¯hu 6¯)
The deluded notion to “respect the emperor and expel the barbarians” (sonno-¯joi¯)
has spread throughout the country since the time when treaties were first concluded
with foreign nations. Due to this, great turmoil has arisen within the country. The
court has been constantly troubled. In the end it would seem that the meaning of this
slogan has nothing to do with respecting the emperor nor with expelling the foreign-
ers. Rather it is only a tricky pretext to give wandering vagrants a chance to seek
sustenance and further a chance for various daimyo who hold sinister designs to
deviate further and further from the instructions of the Tokugawa family. There is no
need to prove this. The evidence is obvious. Chos¯hu¯ is the number one rebel among
the various lords and has begun mutinous plots. Therefore the plans now to attack
and punish Chos¯hu¯ are most welcome. Thanks to this one event we can expect that the
Tokugawa family will be brought closer to the day of its revitalization.
The current endeavor to attack and punish the Chos¯hu¯ rebels presents a good
chance to make everything right once again. I pray that now we should resolutely
decide to subjugate Chos¯hu¯ in one fell swoop and with this momentum go on to reas-
sert control over the various lords and Kyoto, so that the bakufu will be able to con-
duct international relations without interference. Naturally there is no need to delve
into military secrets, but being deeply moved by the unprecedented events I feel that I
must relate the following two or three articles in connection with the present expedi-
tion to punish Chos¯hu,¯ even though I have never before submitted a memorial.
I. Block avenues of communication between the Chos¯hu¯ rebels and the foreign
powers! Announce the charges against Chos¯hu¯ to the world!
As mentioned above regarding the true intentions of the Chos¯hu¯ rebels, the sonno-¯
joi¯ which they advocate has been, right from the outset, only a pretext. Two years ago,
even after their defeat at Shimonoseki, Chos¯hu¯ men repeatedly approached foreign-
ers [ for assistance ]. They endeavored to send students overseas; they invited dishon-
est merchants to Shimonoseki and other places to carry on secret trade; and they
purchased much weaponry. In fact a prohibition of secret trade is specified in the
treaties and the consuls try firmly to enforce it ( previously the year before last the
English consul issued an edict to English ships concerning this). In general, however,
edicts and the such cannot prevent the abuse of the treaties by greedy and dishonest
merchants. Moreover since at this time Chos¯hu¯ has determined to make ready for the
inevitable, it is ever more necessary to devise a policy, poor thought it may be, for us
[the bakufu] to purchase weapons from the foreigners, to borrow money, and if it
comes to the worst, to depend upon the vagrant foreigners by employing foreign war-
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ships, etc. Since this is treading the same path as the Chinese in suppressing the
Taiping rebels, it is difficult to forecast what the eventual outcome may be. This is, I
feel, something which must be considered very carefully.
Concerning this, at the present time several warships have been dispatched to
Nagato and Suo as strict control measures to prevent foreign ships from approaching
these two coasts. Furthermore if small boats from the Chos¯hu¯ rebels should approach
the foreign ships, they will be immediately apprehended. Six years ago during the
American civil war, England secretly sent the southern rebels the warship Alabama
and also furnished weapons, etc., thereby causing the north great embarrassment.
Looking at this precedent, the fact that Chos¯hu¯ now carries on intercourse with for-
eign countries may well lead later to complicated difficulties. In this point I think one
should take special consideration.
Furthermore, in connection with the proclamation of the sins of Chos¯hu¯ to the
world, we have already sent to the consul of each country a 14 point statement of the
charges against Chos¯hu.¯ However, as I mentioned before, Chos¯hu¯ is dispatching stu-
dents overseas to go around and campaign on Chos¯hu’¯s behalf. They will necessarily
aim only at Chos¯hu’¯s profit, proclaiming to everyone far-fetched opinions to their
own advantage and of course slandering the bakufu’s position. In particular, there is
the faction which advocates the idea current now in newspapers of a daimyo confed-
eration.7) Being not satisfied with the present government’s management of affairs,
this argument holds that the existing treaties with foreign nations should be annulled
and that the various daimyo should form a confederation much like the German con-
federation. The various lords of the new confederation should then individually con-
clude treaties. It seems that the British envoy Parkes and others are secretly in agree-
ment with this proposal. Furthermore Satsuma and other domains are sending quite a
number of students overseas and all of them advocate the daimyo confederation.
Naturally overseas they meet together with and trust the Chos¯hu¯ “students.” If they go
all over preaching and writing in the newspapers about the daimyo confederation
argument they may temporarily influence public opinion, and I dare say that it might
change the course of each government’s deliberations with regard to Japan. If by any
chance something like this should happen, needless to say, a civil war would outbreak
and all of Japan and the fortunes of the Tokugawa family would be in turmoil, result-
ing in an irrevocable condition whose harm would be greater in comparison than
Chos¯hu’¯s present treason. Immediately we must do something in order to prevent this
from happening.
Given due consideration, at this time a resident minister should be dispatched to
the capital city of each nation. It is a general custom to conduct diplomatic business
with nations with which a treaty has been signed by mutually exchanging ambassa-
dors; however, we have so far put of the obligation to send a resident minister [imme-
diately after the conclusion of treaties]. Since we have only the consul of the foreign
nations to pass on our intentions to the various foreign governments, naturally there
is the danger that discrepancies in our intentions will occur. This is due to the impro-
(252)
22
priety of not having equal relations with the foreign nations. Due to this, the people of
each country might somehow think that new treaties should be concluded since their
government and ours do not seem to be equal. Therefore, now if we send a resident
minister to England, France, America and Russia in order to carry our diplomatic
business directly with these governments, all of the negotiations will thereby be thor-
ough and efficient. Once the appearance of equality between each nation is pos-
sessed, the public feeling will become tranquil and I think that they will thereby have
doubts concerning the arguments of the students over the daimyo confederation ques-
tion.
In this way if we send resident ministers to every country, diplomacy will become in
all ways more convenient and our intentions to the other countries more clear. It is
customary for foreign nations to fully discuss all matters. Even though it is difficult to
decide the truth or falseness of opinions in newspapers, everyone respects the written
word and if the argument is persuasive, opinions in newspapers may temporarily
influence a government’s deliberations. Therefore it is natural for the overseas stu-
dents sent out by the previously mentioned domain to use the power of newspapers.
Therefore it is imperative to have a newspaper announcement about the dispatching
of resident ministers, and proclaiming our nation’s justification of its views, includ-
ing, of course, a refutation of the daimyo confederation argument. Turning the tables
on the Chos¯hu¯ rebels, we should announce one by one, even the most trivial, the
charges, old and new, against them. Issue this every day and finally the world will all
detest the sins of Chos¯hu,¯ and it will come to be said that those who are friendly with
Chos¯hu¯ do not know honor nor dignity.
Finally, since decisions concerning the dispatching of these resident ministers can-
not be reached in a short time, we should first of all secretly send agents to Yokohama
who would, in accordance with the previously mentioned plan, repeatedly expound
the sins of Chos¯hu¯ and stress the views of the government through the medium of the
Yokohama newspapers. Furthermore it is imperative that it be proclaimed there also
by sending position papers out from time to time to the Russians and Dutch and to all
interested in learning by attaching them to the newspapers.
II. Suppression of civil war by use of foreign aid
First of all, in connection with the impending expedition of chastisement, Chos¯hu¯
has for the past two years been secretly making military preparations. They have
westernized both their weaponry and their military tactics. Furthermore the people of
the domain are desperately hostile to the bakufu. Therefore they are not an insignifi-
cant enemy. Already there is the example of the rout of Ii’s and Sasakahara’s forces.
No matter how many soldiers the various daimyo have in Japanese style, they are of
no use and their numbers merely nominal.
In connection with this, although the Shogun’s military forces, both infantry and
artillery are prepared, the Chos¯hu¯ rebels will be fighting desperately a defensive war
to protect their land. Moreover they have an advantage in weaponry. At present, with
(251)
23
the strength each side possesses, I am deeply worried over the outcome of the war.
Such being the case, we should decide to call on the help of the military power of
foreign countries and thereby in one effort smash the two provinces of Nagato and
Suo. Of course we must take into consideration the fact that relying upon foreign
military power may cause popular unrest and that the expenses incurred will be enor-
mous. This argument may be true in times of peace when there is no particular cause
for popular unrest. Now, however, with the impending fear that suddenly Japan may
be involved in a civil war, and considering the fact popular unrest is already at its
zenith, the above consideration should be dropped. No longer is public sentiment
swayed by the various ideas of the world — only military power can control the na-
tions. All nominal principles are worthless in the face of military power. For example
Akechi Mitsuhide forced Oda Nobunaga into suicide and immediately by imperial
proclamation received Oda’s position as shogun, and likewise when Toyotomi
Hideyoshi successfully had Mitsuhide killed the realm immediately belonged to the
Toyotomi family, the emperor having rewarded even this — and there was no one in
the world who voiced doubts. This was all due to military power. Therefore, now at
this time the Chos¯hu¯ rebels are opposing the government forces in actual battle and if
by any chance they should win, they would then change their name “enemy of the
court” (chot¯eki) to “supporter of the court” (kinno)¯ and graciously give to the gov-
ernment the name “enemy of the court.” Such being the case, it depends entirely upon
the strength and weakness of military power in order to correctly be named. Such
things as imperial proclamations, similar to the edicts of the Roman pope, are merely
embellishments to military power.
Since there is no end to adhering to such a practice, all the more the Chos¯hu¯ pun-
ishment is a great cause to both nominally and in fact carry out a punitive expedition
against the sinner who has offended both god and man— and there is not a single
doubt concerning this.
Accordingly it should be resolved without hesitation to crush the two provinces of
Nagato and Suo with the help of foreign military power, and furthermore to direct the
banner of subjugation directly against the various daimyo who are of a different opin-
ion [than the bakufu].8) With this one action I think that we must exhibit power to the
extent that it completely changes the feudal system throughout all of Japan.
Concerning the purchase of weapons and the employment of foreign military
power there is the consideration of expense, but here too there is nothing to worry
about. This is because the income of the two provinces of Nagato and Suo is at present
annually 1,000,000 pyo¯ which is in gold 2,000,000 ryo.¯ After crushing Chos¯hu¯ a
profit of 2,000,000 ryo¯ will forever be ours. Therefore now if we borrow 20,000,000
ryo¯ and pay the interest, in 20 years the loan will be repaid in full. Of course this is not
to say that such a great sum as 20,000,000 ryo¯ is needed immediately. Our country is
different from the various countries of the West in that we have never before had a law
concerning the issuing of national securities. Therefore it is inconvenient to amass
together a large amount of money at one time. When the Chos¯hu¯ subjugation affair is
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over and all taken care of, when the 2,000,000 ryo¯ comes through every year as ex-
cepted, and with the expectation to negotiate concerning the sending of mercenary
soldiers to foreign countries, everything will be settled and there will be nothing to
worry about whatsoever.
Almost all of the Western nations issue national security bonds. England, for ex-
ample, in 1862 issued securities of 890,000,000 pounds. In that year the English
government’s revenue was only around 70,000,000 pounds. Therefore the proportion
for one year was an income of 700 ryo¯ to a debt of 89,000 ryo. Looking at it in this
way, Japan’s government can be thought of as having the richest treasury in the
world. It would please me greatly if my humble opinions be looked at and adopted.
Furthermore in order to verify the trends of external and internal affairs, since the
middle of the 8th month of last year . . . . rest missing.
From Taikun Monarchy to Meiji Monarchy
Fukuzawa envisioned the shogun at the center of a centralized nation state commit-
ted to a program of Westernization. The emperor in Kyoto was likened to the Pope in
Rome: a religious figure with no real political powers. The draft version of Seiyo¯ jijo,¯
which Fukuzawa appended to his memorial, offers clues to the sort of government
system Fukuzawa thought best for Japan.9) He began with a statement of six features
of civilized politics:
In Europe, civilized politics include the following six articles:
1. Freedom : Citizens may do what they please and their free will should not
be constrained by law.
2. Justice : Citizens may depend upon law for protection against wrongdoing.
3. Religion : The government should not intervene in matters of religious be-
lief.
4. Education : [The government] should cultivate human talent
5. Health and Welfare : People should be protected from cold and famine
6. Arts and Science : [no text]
Fukuzawa then went to list four types of political systems:
1. Monarchy : Decisions are made in the name of the government in which
there is one monarch and a fixed set of laws.
2. Republic : A leader is selected by the people without reference to wealth or
status. Also called government by confederation (gos¯hu¯ seiji).
3. Aristocracy : Government is carried out by an assembly of the wealthy and
respected members of society.
4. Autocracy : The ruler is a despot; orders are issued arbitrarily in the name
of the ruler.
The next section went on to praise England which to Fukuzawa was obviously the
idea form of government: its monarchy give it central authority; its parliament pro-
vided democratic input; and the aristocracy provided stability. The text implied that
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England could serve as a useful model for political reform in Japan. At this stage,
however, Fukuzawa felt that the Tokugawa family should play the role as national
monarch.
In 1866, Fukuzawa saw two possible routes for Japan’s future. First was a daimyo
confederation, led by Chos¯hu ¯and Satsuma. While these domains outwardly advo-
cated an imperial restoration, Fukuzawa equated their “confederate” style of politics
with republicanism — and a republicanism which would not be able to provide the
basis for order among the more than 200 feudal lords. The example of the American
Civil War was all too obvious. His hopes rested instead on monarchy. This conclusion
is clearly stated in a letter written to Fukuzawa Einosuke on the 7th day of the tenth
month, 1866.10)
Greetings. After you set sail on the 25th of the last month the weather has been
fine. I can imagine that by now your are making your way through the Indian Ocean.
All is well here. Three or five days ago people from Nakatsu domain arrived and they
were all pleased to learn that everything is also well with you.
I have been given informal orders to go to America and if so ordered I will depart
at the end of the twelfth month or before the 10th day of the first month [of 1867]. This
time I intend to go aboard the mailship line which has opened between San Francisco
and Hong Kong. I will take that ship as far as San Francisco and then cross over the
Isthmus of Panama and go on to New York. It will take me around 45 days between
Japan and New York.
After you departed conditions in Edo have gradually improved. At the Kaiseijo a
Dutchman named [W. K.] Garatama has been employed and there is talk of the need
to hire English and French instructors as well.
Drill in lance and sword has been terminated at the Kob¯usho [Military Academy]
and a rifle unit called the Yug¯ekitai has been formed. In connection with this, it seems
that the wearing of long and short swords will be ended as I have requested. It gives
me the greatest pleasure that this autumn I will sell off my long and short swords. I
can imagine the day when you will see none of them.
Two or three days ago it was announced that civil and military officials will be free
to choose if they wish to wear tight-fitting drawers or not. When you return you will
find that Japan has completely changed and you won’t see anyone wearing long and
short swords. As for myself, in the near future I am hoping to build a house without
tatami rooms. But I don’t have any “money” — pity me please!
The argument on behalf of establishing a confederation of daimyo is still very much
alive. I have spoken in confidence about this matter to [ Kawaji ] Taro¯ and
[Nakamura] Keisuke [ two other bakufu students sent to England; Kawaji Taro,¯ the
grandson of Kawaji Toshiakira, and Nakamura Keiyu] and I would also like to hear
what you think of my ideas. If the idea to establish a daimyo confederation goes for-
ward, I realize that will make the country very “free,” but ‘This freedom is, I know,
the freedom to fight among Japanese.’ [original in English] No matter how I look at it,
if we don’t set up a Taikun monarchy, the various daimyo will simply squabble among
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themselves and our country’s civilization and enlightenment will not advance. Those
people who today advocate the establishment of a daimyo confederation stand in the
path of the country’s civilization and enlightenment; they are criminals of the world
[whose activities] are unacceptable by the law of nations (bankoku no koh¯o)¯. You
should, by no means, ignore this debate. I end my letter here written in haste and only
touching on important matters. Please write to me when you have the opportunity.”
III. Switching Loyalties?
Fukuzawa maintained he was a non-partisan in the Restoration. His memorial and
his letters show him instead to be a strong supporter of the bakufu. During the Meiji
period, however, his loyalties were clearly with the Meiji state and its chief symbol,
the Meiji emperor. When did he switch loyalties and why? These are not easy ques-
tions. Fukuzawa’s Autobiography cannot be trusted and other sources are ambiguous.
It is probably safe to conclude that Fukuzawa was willing to support any govern-
ment— and any monarch — that promised to advance Japan’s civilization and en-
lightenment. In 1867 Fukuzawa wrote a series of idle jottings or “sayings” which
provides some clues to the question of his personal loyalties:
“It is also said that: A feudal retainer who is loyal only to the lord of the country
may well have a weak sense of patriotic service to the country. A Japanese national
who desires to possess a true sense of patriotic service to the country will not engage
in senseless debate over the pros and cons of opening the country but simply argue on
behalf of a strong and wealthy open country policy. Take this example. At the time of
a village festival, people in the village freely spend money so as to ensure that their
village is not outdone by neighboring villages. They decorate things and if the village
near-by holds a joruri play, they must hold one too and endeavor not in any way to be
left behind. At times of legal disputes between villages, people exert themselves to
protect the good name of their village not done out of any sense of service to the
village head, but rather because they are concerned about the reputation of their
village. Written large, this resembles patriotic service to one’s country. Now in Japan
there are warriors who embody this spirit and who seek to enhance national authority
and ensure that Japan not fall behind foreign countries. If foreign countries have the
technology to produce artillery, then our country also must manufacture them. And if
they have ways to enrich the country through commerce, then we too must learn those
ways. True patriotic service to one’s country consists, therefore, of not falling behind
other countries even by one step. Although it is natural that retainers exert themselves
in loyalty to their lord, they may not know the proper way to perform loyal service.
Stubbornly, retainers may fail to take a broader world view and think only of service
to their lord. In times of emergency those who are determined to risk their lives are
called ‘stupidly loyal.’ The worst example of a ‘stupidly loyal’ person is one whose
loyalty is unwittingly but an act of flattery. This is both dangerous and senseless.
Those who wish to call themselves retainers should take the idea of patriotic service
to the country as their basic premise. Moreover, they should seek to save the country
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by ensuring that their lord as well is not lacking in the great responsibility of patriotic
service to the country. Only in this way can one be said to be a loyal and patriotic
retainer.11)
According to this line of reasoning, horizontal ties of loyalty to country are more
important than vertical ties of loyalty to any one particular lord. Fukuzawa’s loyalty
was pragmatic. He would support the Tokugawa monarchy so long as the shogun
promoted policies designed to promote wealth and power, civilization and enlighten-
ment. And he would support the new Meiji “monarchy” if and when it took up this
mandate.
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